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Evidence-B(i)ased Medicine: Limitations
and Non-Superstition-Based Alternatives
Joshua Green, M.D., Ph.D. (PGY4)
"I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and
express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot
measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a
meagre and unsatisfactory kind."
Lord Kelvin
“How did Lord Kelvin know that?”
Elio Fratarolli

Introductory Remarks
The Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) movement crystallized in the early
1990’s at McMaster University in Canada (3). The movement originally
challenged practitioners to validate their treatments based on reasoning and
clinical studies rather than personal authority (9). In this essay, I will argue
that, contrary to this wholesome intention, EBM is authoritarian in spirit and
actually constricts discourse about how to make clinical decisions.
Epistemological Biases of EBM
The phrase “evidence-based” implies that EBM has the sole right to define
what evidence is and that the alternative must be superstition-based
medicine. EBM uses this authoritarian stance to uphold an evidence
hierarchy by which to assign how much weight to give clinical studies. From
highest to lowest in standing, the ranking of studies is: systematic reviews of
randomized controlled trials (RCTs), meta-analyses of RCTs, individual
RCTs, nonrandomized or uncontrolled trials, and expert opinion (e.g. see
table 1 in ref 5). There are some variations in the schemata proposed but two
factors are constant: 1) RCTs and reviews of RCTs are at the top of the
hierarchy and 2) clinical sources other than formal studies are either not
mentioned or appear at the bottom of the hierarchy as expert opinion.

Jefferson Journal of Psychiatry, Volume 21, Number 1
© 2007 by the authors
On the Web: jdc.jefferson.edu/jeffjpsychiatry

ISSN 1935-0783

One of EBM’s most famous statements vividly describes the implications
of the evidence hierarchy (3):
Evidence-based medicine de-emphasizes intuition, unsystematic clinical experience, and
patholophysiologic rationale as sufficient grounds for clinical decision-making, and
stresses the examination of evidence from clinical research.

Thus, clinical experience (including subconscious knowing and intuition)
and theory-based reasoning are ejected from discourse or are relegated to the
bottom of the hierarchy. Moreover, even within the clinical study category,
the use of randomization and control groups is favored over all other
conceivable characteristics that could make a study good (e.g. study size,
similarity of study to target population, quality of outcome measures). I
often ask myself the question: is this way of viewing evidence the only valid
perspective and is it even a reasonable perspective? In the following
sections, I consider some problems with a strict EBM approach with special
focus on psychiatry.

Problem 1: Assumption that treatment and physician are readily
separable
The technology of RCTs presupposes that the treatment can neatly be
separated from the treater. Although this may be true for pills that affect the
same receptors no matter who prescribes them, I believe that in
psychotherapy, the therapist matters as much as the treatment approach.
Specifically, therapist attributes such as degree of self-acceptance, comfort
with the range of human emotions, and emotional attunement are likely to
matter immensely in outcomes. Imagine, for example a patient who suffered
great humiliation in childhood and therefore acts in rejecting ways towards
others so as not to risk humiliation. Common counterstransference
enactments with such patients include acting overly indulgent or defensive;
both reactions result from the therapist’s struggle to acknowledge and/or
make use of their own anger in useful ways. Another example of the
importance of the therapist’s capacities is in the ability to experience
intimacy; a therapist fear of intimacy could result in sending a patient subtle
cues not to reveal feelings towards the therapist. If we restrict our attention
to RCTs that typically study one variable per study at great cost in time and
labor, we will likely wait decades or centuries before considering the rich
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interactions between therapist, patient, and theoretical framework that are
likely to exist.
Problem 2: De-emphasis of inner experience
A second problem with EMB in psychotherapy is that the implicit
denigration of inner experience and intuition robs the psychotherapist of
important tools. The value of a therapist’s inner experience is eloquently
described by psychoanalytic author Nancy McWilliams (6):
Differentiating between an essentially depressive and an essentially self-defeating
individual . . . turns on the therapist’s noticing that instead of feeling sympathy for a
suffering person, he or she is feeling a sadistic inclination to criticize. The realization that
one may be dealing with a psychopathic person may come via the therapist’s noticing that
he or she feels duped or contemptuously bested. The appreciation of a paranoid core
under an ostensibly depressive presentation may emerge from the therapist’s noting an
anxiety-filled fantasy that the patient will file a malpractice suit.

The point is that our subjective reactions to patients can direct us to
important understandings about patients in ways that external observations
and statistical analysis may miss.
Problem 3: Limitations of numerical scales
A further limitation of EBM in psychotherapy is that commonly-used
symptom-focused scales do not reflect the potential richness of outcomes.
Consider, for example, the following vignette told by a psychodynamic
therapist (2): a middle-aged woman presented with anxiety and panic attacks
that began after she and her family moved to a new city. Her husband, who
had a new job, was away from home much more than he had previously
been. Her husband’s absences triggered anger which was rapidly covered up
by anxiety. Through the therapist’s persistence, the patient began to allow
herself to experience anger. Soon after, the patient was able to associate her
anger with childhood experiences of a sick mother who was in and out of
hospitals until dying when the patient was 12. In fact, she had stomped out
of her mother’s hospital in anger one day before her mother’s death; her
mother’s unresponsiveness had elicited the patient’s fury. The guilt was too
much and the memories of her mother’s death and funeral were repressed
until initiating psychotherapy. As a result of the therapy process, the patient
saw that, “she had nothing to do with the death and . . . was able to feel
compassion for the little girl who had to face her mother’s death alone.” The
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patient was also able to “face all the grief she experienced while her mother
was alive but chronically sick and unavailable.” This vignette illustrates the
kind of gains that are not easily captured by simple numerical scales such as
the Beck Depression Inventory. EBM in its current form is therefore unable
to distinguish between the above treatment and symptomatic improvements
from lorazepam or fluoxetine. In theory, one could devise scales to
“measure” these deeper changes. However, until cumbersome studies are
conducted, such observations are considered hearsay and are off the radar of
EBM.
Problem 4: Under-emphasis on descriptive research
Many findings of great clinical relevance do not come from RCTs.
Consider, for example, the landmark work of attachment theorists such as
John Bowlby, Mary Ainsworth, and Mary Main. These researchers teach us
that children adopt very specific strategies in order to maximize the
likelihood of receiving care from their caregivers; the strategies are called
secure attachment, avoidant attachment, ambivalent attachment, and
disorganized attachment (4). An avoidantly attached child, for instance,
shows few signs of distress in distressing situations because he or she has
learned that showing the appropriate emotions actually elicit negative
responses from the caregiver. This developmental experience could
undoubtedly harden into fixed attributions about others as the child becomes
an adult. The relevance of this understanding for psychotherapy seems
transparent yet the absence of RCTs in attachment research means that EBM
offers little reason to take note of the important findings.
Problem 5: Sanitized RCT Populations
RCTs are usually designed to study a single intervention in a single
condition. Potentially confounding conditions (i.e. comorbidities) are
therefore excluded. This approach has the advantage of good internal
validity: the intervention can more easily be shown to affect the condition.
However, the omission of comorbidities also raises the question of whether
external validity is thereby compromised: in other words, do the results
apply to individuals who are unlike the patients in RCT study populations
(in that they have multiple conditions which may interact in complex ways)?
For example, numerous RCTs show that antidepressants are effective in
treating symptoms of major depression in people without comorbid
personality disorders. Are antidepressants effective for patients with major
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depression and personality disorders? Does the answer depend on the
particular personality disorder? Most of the data on antidepressants do not
address such issues.
Problem 6: Combinatorial issues
Systematic reviews of RCTs, the favorite technology of EBM, are most
helpful in evaluating single interventions for discrete problems. To the
extent that clinical situations usually involve multiple problems with
multiple potential interventions, the number of options is large. Accordingly,
the number of RCTs that would be required to create a truly “evidencedbased” world could be staggering. Saver and Kalafut (2001), for example,
based estimates of necessary comparison trials on the number of agents
approved or in late phase III clinical trials for Alzheimer’s disease or
ischemic stroke (7):
Possible combination regimens number 128 (27) for Alzheimer disease and 32
(25) for ischemic stroke. Hierarchical, serial clinical trials would permit identification
of the optimum combination of these agent classes for Alzheimer disease
through 127 trials, enrolling 63,500 patients, requiring 286 years; for ischemic
stroke through 31 trials, enrolling 186,000 patients, requiring 155 years.

The impracticality requires no further comment.

CONCLUSIONS
Evidence obtained from clinical experience, basic theories of health and
disease, and clinical studies is crucial to making good clinical decisions.
EBM tends to narrow the field of inquiry to RCTs and thereby discourages
discussion of complex questions of how and when to apply evidence from a
broad range of sources. In place of EBM’s doctrines, I suggest robust
discussion of difficult epistemological issues and recognition that there are
probably many valid perspectives about how to make clinical judgements.
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